We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game in the nonnegative orthrant. The state of the system is governed by controlled reflecting diffusions in the nonnegative orthrant. We consider discounted and average payoff evaluation criteria. We prove the existence of values and optimal strategies for both payoff criteria.  2002 Elsevier Science
INTRODUCTION
We study a zero-sum stochastic differential game in the nonnegative orthrant. This has a potential application in communication networks with heavy traffic. In communication networks we often encounter situations where different users may have different objectives. Each user wishes to optimize a certain performance measure related to his traffic parameters, e.g., minimizing delays, maximizing throughput, minimizing blocking probabilities, etc. Conflicting situations arise when different users cannot coordinate their actions, and hence the problem cannot be reduced to a single control optimization problem. This can happen due to the nature of the network, or some user may be tempted to benefit at the expense of others by choosing an individual "good" policy. This motivates us to treat the problem in a game theoretic framework.
We first present a heuristic description of the network model. A more general problem will be discussed in the next section. Consider a sequence of open queueing networks consisting of d service stations with increasing traffic intensity. Let the sequence be parameterized by n so that in the heavy traffic limit n → ∞. Let Q n i t denote the number of customers at the service station i at time t of the nth network, and let X n i t = 1 √ n Q n i t be the corresponding normalized process. Let A n i t be the number of customers arriving at the ith server from outside by time t. Assume there are M users (i.e., sources which send customers) for the networks. Each user controls the arrival process in an implicit manner. Thus the arrival process is a controlled counting process, the intensity of which is given by
where λ i λ i are nonnegative measurable functions, x = x 1 x 2 x d is the state of the system, and x i denotes the number of customers at the ith server. The intensity of the arrival process is split into two additive terms with appropriate scaling. In the limiting situation as n → ∞, the function λ i contributes to the drift of the system which is being controlled by the users by the appropriate choices of their actions u 1 u 2 u M from their respective action spaces. The function λ i contributes to the volatility (i.e., the uncertainty) of the system which is not controlled by the users. In other words the users control the mean of the state but are not equipped to control the sudden fluctuations of the state process. For the nth network, let N n ij t be the number of customers moving from server i to j by time t and let N n i t denote the number of customers who complete service at server i by time t. Let N n i0 t be the number of customers who leave the network from station i by time t. Then We allow the users to control the service time as well, since by paying additional charges they can opt for better quality of the service. As a result, N n i t is a controlled counting process with intensity given as follows: when the state is at x = x 1 x 2 x d and the users choose their actions u 1 u 2 u M from their respective action spaces, then the intensity of the process is given by
The intensity of the service time process is also split into two terms µ i µ i , which are nonnegative measurable functions with suitable scaling.
Here again, in the limiting process the function µ i contributes to the drift of the system which is controlled by the users, and µ i contributes to the volatility of the system. Let p ij 1 ≤ i ≤ d 0 ≤ j ≤ d, represent the probability that a customer goes to server j after completing the service from server i. We designate the routing matrix by P = p ij 1≤i j≤d . To ensure the stability of the system we assume that P has a spectral radius strictly less than 1. We look at the limiting network-more precisely, the dynamics of the limiting network when the traffic is heavy. We say that the traffic in a network is heavy, if at each server the traffic intensity, i.e., the ratio of the mean service time to the mean interarrival time, is nearly 1. Hence as n → ∞ we have to assume that the traffic intensity of the nth network tends to 1. To this end we assume that
This ensures that the traffic intensity tends to 1 as n → ∞. Note that for a single server queue (1.3) reflects the fact that the intensity of the arrival process and the intensity of the service time process are equal, which is precisely the heavy traffic condition. Hence the limiting process represents the dynamics of a network with d servers under heavy traffic assumption. Following [16] we can show, under suitable assumptions, that
· converges weakly to the process X · , which is represented by the stochastic differential equation given by
where X t = X 1 t X d t , and W i · B ij · are the standard independent Wiener process in u i t i = 1 2 M t ≥ 0, are the actions taken by the users at time t, and
The equation (1.4) represents a controlled diffusion process in the nonnegative orthrant. By a solution to (1.4) we mean a pair of continuous time processes X · ξ · , where X · takes values in the nonnegative orthrant. The process ξ · is a continuous time nondecreasing process which increases only at the boundary of the orthrant. When X · hits the boundary it is reflected instantaneously along a vector field which we describe below. The direction of reflection is given by the matrix I − P. When X · hits the boundary point in x i = 0 , it is reflected along I − P i , the ith row of I − P. On the boundary points x i 1 = x i 2 = · · · = x i k = 0 , the direction of reflection is
Under suitable assumptions, it can be shown that at the corner, the process is never absorbed.
We now describe the differential game problem. Each user (referred to as a player) considers the rest of the players as a single superplayer and tries to find a minimax equilibrium. This gives him an "optimal" strategy against the worst case scenario, i.e., the aim of each player is to guarantee the best performance under the worst case behavior of the superplayer. We can view the situation as follows: each player takes the rest of the players as his adversary. Since the actions of the superplayer are not completely known to the particular player, to achieve his security strategy against the worst case scenario, he assumes that he controls the arrival process, and the superplayer tries to block him by controlling the service time. Thus, the particular player, say player 1, controls the arrival process of the network, and the superplayer controls the service time process through their actions. Hence the driftb takes the following form:
where u 1 denotes the action of player 1 and u 2 denotes the actions of the superplayer. (Here u 2 represents the actions chosen by the players 2 3
M. Thus u 2 replaces u 2 u M in the previous notation.) We assign a cost to the particular player, i.e., player 1 against the other players (superplayer), as
where c · typically represents the holding cost, and γ > 0 and θ > 0 are constants, u 1 u 2 ∈ 0 1 . When the state is x and for the actions u i of the player i, the player 1 incurs a cost r x u 1 u 2 . Naturally, player 1 tries to minimize the cost through his actions, whereas player 2 (superplayer) tries to maximize the same through his actions. Thus we have reduced the M-player game to a two-player game. An analogous model in discrete time has been studied by Altman [2] . Motivated by this problem, we study a more general stochastic differential game with reflecting diffusion in the orthrant, which we describe in the next section. In [5] Borkar and Ghosh have studied stochastic differential games with nondegenerate diffusions for various payoff criteria. Ghosh and Kumar [7] have studied zero-sum stochastic differential games with reflecting (nondegenerate) diffusions in a smooth bounded domain. In this paper we first discretize the orthrant by a sequence of bounded smooth domains. We then use the results from [7] and limiting arguments to derive the corresponding results in the orthrant.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe a more general problem which subsumes the game problem arising in the network. In Section 3 we discuss the stochastic differential game with the discounted payoff criteria. We show the existence of the value function and optimal Markov strategies for both players. In Section 4, we study the ergodic payoff criterion. Using a Lyapunov-type stability assumption, we prove the existence of the value of the game and optimal Markov strategies for both players. In Section 5 we apply our theory to a simplified model. Section 6 concludes the paper with a few remarks.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND PRELIMINARIES
Let U i i = 1 2, be compact metric spaces and let V i = U i be the space of probability measures on U i endowed with the Prohorov topology.
We consider a stochastic differential game with the state of the game evolving according to a controlled reflecting diffusion in the orthrant D. It is represented by the following stochastic differential equation:
where W · is the standard Wiener process in d and v i · is a V i -valued process which is progressively measurable with respect to the σ-field generated by X t . The process v i · is called an admissible strategy for the player i i = 1 2. By a solution to (2.1) we mean a pair of continuous time processes X · ξ · satisfying (2.1). The process X · is D valued. In D it evolves like a controlled diffusion process, and when it hits the boundary, it is reflected instantaneously in the interior of D along the vector field governed by γ. The process ξ · is a nondecreasing process which increases only when X · hits the boundary ∂D. We call A i i = 1 2, the set of all admissible strategies for player i. An admissible strategy v i ∈ A i is said to be a Markov strategy if v i t = v i X t for some v i D → V i measurable; i.e., the choice of the action by player i at time t depends only on the state of the dynamics at time t. By an abuse of notation, we denote the map v i as the Markov strategy for player i. We denote by M i the set of all Markov strategies for the player i. The existence of a solution of (2.1) in a smooth domain is usually proved by the well-known penalization method [12, 13] . But note that the domain D has a corner at the origin. This creates a technical problem. If the direction of reflection γ is not chosen properly then the process X t may be absorbed at the origin [15] , a situation that is unrealistic for application to network problems. To avoid the absorption of X t at the origin, we impose appropriate conditions on γ. The existence of a solution of (2.1) is usually achieved in three steps: (i) approximate D by appropriate smooth domains, (ii) establish the existence of a solution to (2.1) in these smooth domains, (iii) use convergence arguments to obtain a solution of (2.1) in D. To this end we first approximate the nonnegative orthrant D in the following way.
Then D m satisfies the following properties.
(iii) For any K compact and
To ensure the existence of a unique solution of (2.1), we make the following assumptions on b σ, and γ.
(A1)
(i) The function b is continuous, Lipschitz continuous in its first argument uniformly with respect to the rest.
(ii) The function σ is Lipschitz continuous.
(iii) The function defined by a = σσ is uniformly elliptic, i.e., there exists δ 0 > 0 such that
The function γ is such that all of the partial derivatives exist and are continuous and there exists δ 1 > 0 such that
and n · n m · denote, respectively, the outward normal to ∂D (on 0 ) and ∂D m . Note that for m large enough γ is defined on ∂D m . So we can assume, without loss of generality, that γ is defined on ∂D m for all m ≥ 1.
(ii) There exists a symmetric matrix valued map
, and satisfies the following:
For a given v 1 v 2 ∈ A 1 × A 2 , under the assumptions (A1) and (A2), (2.1) has a unique weak solution [12] . Moreover, if the players use Markov strategies then the process X · is strong Markov.
Some comments are in order now.
Remark 2.1. When d = 2 D m has the following simple form:
The assumptions (A1)(i), (ii) are the usual Lipschitzian assumptions. The assumption (A1)(iii) is the nondegeneracy condition. In other words we are studying controlled nondegenerate reflecting diffusion in the nonnegative orthrant.
(b) The assumption (A2)(i) ensures that when the process X t hits the boundary ∂D, it is reflected inward instantaneously along a direction governed by γ, and it does not "slip" along the boundary.
(c) The assumption (A2)(ii) is rather technical. The condition is used to get suitable estimates on the process X t in appropriate seminorm, which leads to the uniqueness of the solution of (2.1). For a smooth domain, (A2)(ii) follows from (A2)(i); see [12] for details.
(d) Following [5] we give an interpretation of the admissible strategies of the players. Note that an admissible strategy v i · for player i i = 1 2, is a nonanticipative functional of the process X · , i.e., v i t = f i t X · for a measurable, adapted (w.r.t. the σ-field generated by X t ) f i · · . The idea behind this is that whatever extraneous randomization the players might want to incorporate into their controls is already subsumed in the fact that they are choosing V i -valued processes rather than U i -valued ones. One consequence of this is that the conditional law of X · , given X 0 = x, is a.s. the law of a process X x · controlled by strategies v i · = f i · X x · , with X x 0 = x. Thus we may prescribe the strategies v i · for arbitrary initial data by prescribing the f i 's. Therefore player 1 chooses the function f 1 , whereas player 2 chooses f 2 . These choices are made independently of each other. This is how the strict noncooperative nature of the game is maintained at all times. Remark 2.3. We now analyze the network problem discussed in Section 1 as a special case of (2.1). By renaming u 2 u M as u 2 , the equation (1.4) can be rewritten as
where for x = x 1 x d ∈ D u i ∈ U i i = 1 2 P is the routing matrix,
where − µ i x i is the ith entry, and diag. stands for diagonal matrix,
where − p ij µ i x i is the ith entry and p ij µ i x i is the jth entry,
Here denotes the transpose and W · = W i · B ij · 1≤i≤d 0≤j≤d . We make the following assumptions for the network problem.
(A1) (i) inf 0≤x<∞ min i λ i x µ i x > 0.
(ii) The spectral radius of P is strictly less than 1.
i.e., each element of the vectors is strictly positive.
Using (A1) (ii) we can show that is positive definite. Note that is not a square matrix. So by a martingale representation theorem [10, pp. 382-390] 
Note that in (2.3), the direction of reflection γ does not satisfy the smoothness property. In fact γ is piecewise constant. With the additional assumptions (A1) , the equation (2.3) has a unique weak solution [16] .
Remark 2.4. The assumption (A1) (i) makes the diffusion matrix realvalued. The condition (A1) (ii) guarantees that is positive definite and the assumption (A1) (iii) is the heavy traffic condition.
We now describe the zero-sum stochastic differential game. Letr D × U 1 × U 2 → be the cost function. When the state of the system is x ∈ D and player i chooses his action u i i = 1 2, player 2 receives a payoff r x u 1 u 2 from player 1. Naturally, player 2 tries to maximize the cumulative payoff and player 1 tries to minimize the same. We make the following assumption for the cost function.
(A3) The functionr is bounded, continuous, and Lipschitz in its first argument uniformly with respect to the rest.
The planning horizon is infinite, and we study two different types of payoff criteria: discounted payoff and (long-run) average payoff.
Discounted Payoff
Let α > 0 be the discount factor. Let v 1 v 2 ∈ A 1 × A 2 . The α-discounted payoff to player 2 for the initial condition x ∈ D is defined by
for anyṽ 2 ∈ A 2 . The function R α D → is called the α-discounted lower value function of the game. Similarly, a strategy v * 2 ∈ A 2 is said to be α-discounted optimal for player 2 for initial condition x if
for anyṽ 1 ∈ A 1 . The function R α D → is called the α-discounted upper value function of the game. If R α ≡ R α , then the game is said to admit a value for discounted criterion, and the common function is denoted by R α and is called an α-discounted value function. If a Markov strategy v i ∈ M i is α-discounted optimal for all initial conditions, then it is said to be α-discounted optimal for player i. Clearly the existence of a pair of α-discounted optimal strategies for both players ensures that the α-discounted value function exists.
Average Payoff
Then average payoff to player 1 for the initial condition x is defined as
The definitions of average optimal strategies and average value are similar. For u 1 u 2 ∈ U 1 × U 2 and for a suitable function f D → write
Remark 2.5. Note that the domain D m has a smooth boundary. It is unbounded, however. In the next section we use results from reflecting diffusions in a smooth bounded domain. To do this we approximate the domain D m by an increasing sequence of smooth bounded domains D mn in
Now define
The set E n i i ≥ 3, is defined similarly. Define 
In the next sections we consider stochastic differential equations on domains D mn . So we need the assumption (A2)(i) to be satisfied for D mn also. This can be achieved by extending γ to the whole of d such that γ satisfies (A2)(i) on D mn . We also consider a stochastic differential game with state evolving according to (2.1) in D m (or D mn ) with reflection along γ. The definitions of the admissible and Markov strategies for these games are analogous to the definitions in Section 2. By an abuse of notation we continue to denote the set of all admissible and Markov strategies for player i of these games by A i and M i , respectively.
DISCOUNTED PAYOFF CRITERION
The value function of a differential game is usually associated with the solution of a nonlinear partial differential equation referred to as an Isaacs equation. The Isaacs equation for an α-discounted payoff is given by
Note that in (3.1) inf sup need not be equal to sup inf in general. In our set-up we use a minimax theorem of Fan [6] to ensure the equality. Indeed we show that (3.1) has a unique solution.
Theorem 3.1. Assume (A1)-(A3). Then the α-discounted value function R α · exists and is the unique bounded solution in
Proof. Fix m ≥ 1. Consider the partial differential equation
First we show that (3.2) has a solution in an appropriate sense. Consider the partial differential equation
Note that (3.3) is the Isaacs equation for the same stochastic differential game with D mn as the state space and with reflection on ∂D mn along γ.
Hence from the result of [7] it follows that (3.3) has a unique solution φ mn ∈ C 2 D mn ∩ C 1 D mn , and φ mn is the α-discounted value function of this game. Thus φ mn is given by
where X · is the process given by (2.1) in D mn with reflection along γ,
where C > 0 is a bound for the cost functionr . Let Q k ⊂ D m k ≥ 1, be an increasing sequence of compact sets such that
Using the estimate from [11, Lemma 1.1, p. 247] there exists a constant C 1 > 0 which depends only on C α b σ, and dist Q k D mN k such that
Then using the uniform Lipschitzian assumption in (A1), it follows from (3.3) that
where C 2 > 0 is a constant depending on C α b σ, and dist Q k D mN k . We next use the estimates from [8, p. 177], for 2 ≤ p < ∞, to find a constant C 3 > 0 depending on C α b σ, and dist Q k D mN k such that
Since W 2 p Q k is compactly imbedded in W 1 p Q k , for each k ≥ 1, there exists a subsequence, say φ mn k , which converges to some φ m in W 1 p Q k . Now by a routine diagonalization argument, we have, along a suitable subsequence,
Hence along a suitable subsequence (for simplicity of notation we denote this by the same sequence)
Hence, using the uniform Lipschitzian condition in (A1), we have inf
Now using (3.5) and (3.6), it follows from (3.3), by letting n → ∞, that
in the sense of distribution and φ m ∈ W 1 p loc D m . Using (A1)(iii), it follows from elliptic regularity results [8, p. 175 
Let Q k ⊆ D k ≥ 1 be an increasing sequence of compact sets such that ∞ k=1 Q k = D and let R k be a positive integer such that
Then using the arguments as above, for 2 ≤ p < ∞, we can find a constant C 4 depending only on C α b σ, and dist
Now repeating the arguments described above, we can show that along a subsequence
in the sense of distribution and φ ∈ W [6] , it follows that
Hence φ is a solution of (3.1). By a measurable selection theorem [4] , there exist v * 1 ∈ M 1 and v * 2 ∈ M 2 such that
Let v 2 ∈ A 2 and let v * 1 ∈ M 1 be as in (3.9) . Let X · be the process given by (2.1) in D corresponding to v * 1 v 2 with the initial condition X 0 = x. Then by standard arguments involving Ito's formula for the function e −αt φ · and for the process X · , it follows as in [7] that
Therefore,
Similarly,
Thus it follows that
Hence the value function R α · exists and is a bounded solution to (3.1) in the desired class of functions. Now to complete the proof we have to establish the uniqueness of the solution. For this, suppose ψ to be another bounded solution to (3.1) in the same class of functions. Let K > 0 be a common bound for R α · and ψ · . Using Ito's formula, it can be shown as in [7] that
By closely mimicking the arguments in [7] we can prove the following theorem concerning the existence of optimal strategies. We omit the details.
Then v * 1 is α-discounted optimal for player 1. Similarly, let v * 2 ∈ M 2 be such that
Then v * 2 is α-discounted optimal for player 2.
Remark 3.1. The existence of the outer minimizing selector v * 1 ∈ M 1 in (3.11) and the outer maximizing selector v * 2 ∈ M 2 in (3.12) is guaranteed by a measurable selection theorem [4] . Hence Theorem 3.2 proves the existence of α-discounted optimal Markov strategies for both players.
Remark 3.2. From the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can see that, by invoking Fan's minimax theorem and an appropriate application of Ito's formula, the α-discounted value function of the stochastic game with state given by (2.1) in D m with reflection on ∂D m along γ exists and is the unique bounded solution in
This fact will be used in the next section.
ERGODIC PAYOFF CRITERION
In the ergodic payoff, the asymptotic behavior of the system plays a crucial role. Hence we make a further assumption to ensure the stability of the system. (A4) There exist a symmetric positive definite matrix Q and a scalar λ > 0 such that, for all x y ∈ D, u 1 u 2 ∈ U 1 × U 2 ,
where a x y = σ x − σ y σ x − σ y , andb x y u 1 u 2 = b x u 1 u 2 −b x u 1 u 2 .
First we give a couple of examples where the assumption (A4) is satisfied.
, and u i ∈ U i ; let C 1 , C 2 be real matrices of order
of B having negative real parts. Let Q be the symmetric positive definite matrix satisfying B Q + QB = −I d . Now for x = y,
Hence (A4) is satisfied for any λ ∈ 0 1 .
where λ is a suitable constant. Set σ x = I d . Then with Q = 1 2λ
Hence for λ > 5, (A4) is satisfied.
Let X · be the corresponding solution of (2.1). By (A1), (A2), and (A4), it follows from [14, pp. 19-21] that X t has a unique invariant measure denoted by η v 1 v 2 . Indeed, using the Lyapunov function x Qx 1/2 , we can prove the following additional result on the flow governed by (2.1). An analogous result was obtained in [3] . 
Proof. Let w x = x Qx 1/2 , x ∈ D m . Let ∂ i denote the partial derivative with respect to the ith coordinate. Set
Now using (A4), for x = y, we have
whereλ depends only on λ > 0. Hence for some C 5 > 0
Let τ = inf t ≥ 0 X x t = X y t . Using Ito's formula and the above inequality, we have
Since (2.1) evolving in D m has a pathwise unique solution (see [11] ), we have for t ≥ τ, X x t = X y t a.s. Hence
Ew X x t − X y t ≤ w x − y − C 5 E t 0 w X x s − X y s ds Using Grownwall's lemma, we have
Since Q is positive definite, we have
where C 6 > 0 depends only on the smallest and largest eigenvalues of Q.
As in the discounted payoff, we prove the existence of the value of the game and the optimal Markov strategies by analytic methods. The Isaacs equations for the average payoff criterion are given by,
where ρ is a scalar and φ is a suitable function. By a solution we mean a pair ρ φ satisfying (4.1) in an appropriate sense. Let
for some C > 0 Proof. Consider the partial differential equation 
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 4.1 and (A3). Hence where C 11 > 0 is independent of m. Let Q k ⊆ D k ≥ 1, be an increasing sequence of compact sets so that
Now repeating the arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, there exists a constant C 12 > 0 which depends only on C b σ, and dist
Also, ρ m ≤ C, where C > 0 is a bound forr. Hence along a suitable subsequence,
Now by a routine diagonalization argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can show that along a suitable subsequence,
Now using arguments as in Theorem 3.1, we can show that φ ρ * is a solution to (4.1) 
Let v 2 ∈ A 2 and let v * 1 ∈ M 1 be as in (4.6). Let X · be the process given by (2.1) in D corresponding to v * 1 v 2 with the initial condition X 0 = x. Then by standard arguments involving Ito's formula for the function e αt φ · and for the process X · , as in [7] , it follows that
Hence ρ * is the value of the game. The uniqueness of φ can be obtained by closely mimicking the arguments in [5] . We omit the details.
Finally, using Theorem 4.1, we can obtain the analog of Theorem 3.2. We again omit the details. Then v * 2 is α-discounted optimal for player 2.
AN APPLICATION TO A QUEUING MODEL
We first consider a simplified version of the model discussed in Section 1. Consider a heavy traffic queue which is the limit of a sequence of queues with one server. Let the intensity of the arrival process be Clearly the assumptions (A1), (A1) are satisfied. Note that the functionr is unbounded. We can modify the arguments is Section 3, however, to show that the α-discounted value function R α is the unique solution of (5.2) in the class of functions belonging to C 2 0 ∞ ∩ C 1 0 ∞ with quadratic growth condition. Note that (5.2) can be written as αφ x = inf Thus both players have nonrandomized Markov strategies, and the structure of the optimal strategies of both players are explicitly determined in terms of the value function. For the ergodic payoff criterion, we can obtain analogous results. For the queueing network with d servers as described in the Introduction, we can derive analogous results. It is difficult, however, to get the explicit structure of the optimal strategies as in (5.5), (5.6).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study an abstract stochastic game problem where the state is given by the controlled reflecting diffusion in the nonnegative orthrant. This abstract problem generalizes a differential game problem arising in communication networks with heavy traffic. For the abstract problem, we establish the existence of the value and optimal Markov strategies for both players. For the network problem, we establish the existence of nonrandomized optimal Markov strategies for both players.
